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RESUMO 
O objefivo desse artigo e discufir a credibilidade de duos reformas de combate a 
inflagao adotadas no Brasil: os Pianos Cruzado e Collor. Assume-se que a origem do 
problema de credibilidade vem da interagdo entre as auforidades monetdria e fiscal 
estabelecida pela resfrigdo orgamenfdria infertemporal. Credibilidade e definida como 
a probabilidade subjetiva de que o governo esta seguindo as politicas por ele 
anunciadas. Os resultados obfidos indicam que ambas as reformas monetdrias 
encorajaram uma polJfica para a autoridade monetdria, que seria apropriada para um 
regime ricardiano, mas estabeleceram pianos de imposfos e gastos que seriam facfiveis 
somenfe num regime de domindncia fiscal. Tais politicas monetdria e fiscal sdo, 
contudo, incompatfveis. Ndo e factivel levar adiante ambas ao mesmo tempo e isso 
explica a baixa credibilidade global e, em ultima instdncia, o fracasso, das duos 
reformas econdmicas. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the credibility of two disinflationary reforms adopted in Brazil, the 
Cruzado and Collor Plans. The source of the credibility problem is assumed to lie in the 
interaction between the monetary and fiscal authorities established by the government 
budget constraint. Credibility is defined as the subjective probability that the 
government is following the announced policies. The results obtained indicate that both 
monetary reforms encouraged a policy for the monetary authority that would be 
appropriate for a Ricardian regime but advocated plans for taxes and expenditures that 
could only be feasible under a fiscal dominance regime. Such monetary and fiscal 
policies are, however, incompatible. It is not feasible to carry out both at the same time, 
and this explains the overall low credibility, and ultimate failure, of these two economic 
reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In contemporary discussions of deflationary policies it is an accepted argument 
that the greater the credibility of the anti-inflationary program, the lower the costs 
associated with it in terms of output and employment. 
The recent literature on monetary credibility has concentrated almost exclusively 
on the strategic interdependence of private individuals and centralized 
policymakers.1 In a one-shot monetary game, where the policymaker and private 
agents are fully informed about each other's objectives and the state of the economy, 
the credibility issue arises because there is an incentive for policymakers to seek 
short-run gains by generating inflationary surprises. The problem is that rational, 
private agents understand this incentive and adjust the nominal wage contract so 
as to achieve the real wage they aimed at in the first place. As a consequence, when 
the government inflates, employment remains at its natural level. Therefore, the 
only result of the government's discretionary policy is a positive inflation rate. 
The inflationary bias of monetary policy was termed "dynamic inconsistency" by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). Dynamic inconsistency occurs when a policy that 
seemed optimal at the planning date is no longer considered optimal later on, even 
though no new information has been obtained during the period. 
In repeated monetary policy games with perfect information a credible equilibrium is 
sutained by a "reputational" or "deterrence" mechanism operating through strategies 
that prevent the policymaker from producing the discretionary inflation rate. 
For example, Barro and Gordon (1983a), (1983b) proposed a simple trigger 
mechanism: if the policymaker fails to achieve the expected inflation rate in the 
previous period, the private sector anticipates the discretionary outcome. On the 
other hand, if the policymaker is able to make previous inflation meet expectations, 
the private sector believes it will follow the announced rule in the period.2 This 
implies that the policymaker must compare the temptation to inflate at the 
discretionary rate (equal to the difference in the current value of its objectives 
when it chooses the discretionary instead of the announced rate of inflation) with 
the expected value of welfare loss associated with the increase in the private sector's 
inflationary expectations (the enforcement). 
1 Very good surveys of the literature can be found in BLACKBURN & CHRISTENSEN (1989) 
and FISCHER (1990). 
2 The capacity of these incentive schemes to prevent the policymaker from engaging in opportunistic 
behavior depends on the absolute value of the punishment, the length of the punishment period 
and the policymaker's rate of time preference (as the punishment only occurs in future periods, 
if the monetary authority^ discounts the future more heavily, the penalty is less important to 
him). 
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Monetary games with asymmetric information, where a player with superior 
information can misrepresent during a period in order to build a reputation and 
take advantage of it in the future, make a deeper conceptualization and 
understanding of credibility possible. 
The first type of uncertainty is called intrinsic uncertainty and it relates to the fact 
that one of the players does not know the preferences of the other players in the 
game. Backus and Drifill (1985a), (1985b) and Barro (1990), formulated a model 
in which the policymaker can be of two types. Type 1 (hard or strong) is known 
for his aversion to inflation and Type 2 (soft or weak) is known for his temptation 
to produce unanticipated inflation. Since the private agents are unaware of which 
type is in command, Type 2 has an incentive to appear strong, at least initially, to 
discourage inflationary expectations. This occurs because, if high inflation is 
immediately observed. Type 2 reveals himself as weak and the discretionary outcome 
is observed for the rest of the game. On the other hand, if a Type 2 policymaker 
pretends to be a Type 1 by playing low inflation he can keep inflationary 
expectations low until he considers it worthwhile to inflate. Credibility (or 
reputation) is, then, a state variable that measures the private sector's subjective 
probability that the policymaker is strong, and is updated according to Bayes' rule. 
Another model of asymmetric information was developed by Cukierman (1986, 
1992). In this case, the private sector does not know the current state of the 
policymaker's objectives but can draw inferences about it from the past monetary 
growth rates.3 These inferences, however, are noisy due to the fact that monetary 
growth reflects not only shifts in the policymaker's preferences but also transitory 
control errors, and that its control is imperfect.4 This formulation, then, takes into 
account intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty, the latter being related to imperfect 
information about the stochastic shocks that hit the economy. Since the private 
sector does not immediately notice a change in the policymaker's objectives due to 
its incapacity to distinguish persistent changes in objectives from transitory control 
errors, credibility here appears as the speed with which the private sector recognizes 
that a sustained shift in the policymaker's preference has occurred. It is represented 
by a parameter in opposition to a state variable. The worse the control of the 
money stock, the longer the time necessary for the public to recognize a change in 
the central bank's objectives, and the lower the credibility. 
3 As it is assumed to be a unique relationship between monetary growth rates and inflation rates, 
those who want to maintain the discussion in terms of choice of inflation rate can do so, as 
BLACKBURN & CHRISTENSEN (1989) did. We prefer to proceed using monetary growth 
as it was used in the original work. 
4 CUKIERMAN (1992) also formulates a model in which the policymaker's incapacity to precisely 
control inflation results from imperfect information about the state of the money demand. The 
conclusions are similar to those described here. Although the two sources of imperfect control 
are evaluated separately, he observes that they may operate simultaneously in real economies. 
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Although considering a single institution or individual to be responsible for the 
conduct of economic policy can represent a convenient abstraction, it is particularly 
misleading when credibility problems are taken into account. It is well known that 
the government lifetime solvency requirement imposes strong restrictions on the 
viability of anti-inflationary programs. Therefore, the source of the credibility 
problem lies, in fact, in the interaction between the monetary and fiscal authorities 
established by the government's budget constraint. 
The purpose of this paper is to obtain empirical estimates for the credibility of the 
Cruzado and Collor Plans based on this view, that is, assuming that the credibility 
of monetary policy is related to the coherence of the macroeconomic policy as a 
whole, and not just to monetary policy. According to Baxter (1985), credibility is 
defined as the private agent's subjective probability that an economic reform actually 
occurred. The public updates its probability concerning the government's 
commitment to the policy reform using Bayes' rule.5 Since her methodology was 
developed for a fixed exchange rate regime, it applies directly to the Cruzado Plan. 
In order to apply the procedure to the Collor Plan, however, the feasibility 
conditions for a credible monetary reform must be extended to capture the main 
characteristics of a floating exchange rate regime.6 
5 There are only a few empirical works that test for credibility The most commonly used procedure 
is the forecast error method. When applied to the Phillips curve, support for the credibility 
hypothesis is provided if an estimated Phillips curve for one policy regime overestimates the rate 
of inflation for a new policy regime characterized by less inflation. In other words, negative 
forecast errors indicate the presence of credibility effect. BLANCHARD (1984) estimated a 
Phillips curve for the United States during 1979-1983 and also made estimations using the term 
structure of interest rates. CHRISTENSEN (1987a, 1987b) estimated a Phillips curve for 
Denmark and considered the nominal interest rate determination respectively. CROUSHORE 
& KOOT (1991) created two credibility variables and used them to verify how the Phillips 
curve estimates obtained by Blanchard change. The first measure of credibility compares the Fed 
forecasts of inflation and private sector's forecast, and the second one compares the Fed forecasts 
and actual inflation. These measures, then, capture respectively whether the public believes that 
the announced policy will in fact be implemented and if it will have the expected effect. AGENOR 
& TAYLOR (1992) argued that the parallel market premium is the adequate measure of credibility 
because it is sensitive to market expectations regarding economic policy. When private agents 
are suspicious about a disinflationary policy, they switch to foreign-denominated assets in order 
to avoid the inflation tax that is expected to occur given an anticipation of another inflationary 
surge. For a fixed supply of foreign assets, and other things kept equal, the parallel market 
exchange rate should depreciate, and the premium rise. Therefore the part of the parallel premium 
that cannot be explained by movements in the market fundamentals (domestic credit, past 
domestic inflation etc.) must result from changes in the credibility of economic policy. An 
application to the Brazilian Cruzado Plan was made. 
6 Baxter's approach is chosen for two reasons in addition to the fact that she emphasizes that the 
credibility of a monetary reform depends on both monetary and fiscal policies. First, it follows 
closely the theoretical literature on credibility and reputation. Second, it is used to analyze countries 
characterized by hyperinflation, probably those that would benefit most from a credibility effect. 
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Section 1 describes how monetary and fiscal policy interact, and deduces the 
feasibility conditions of each that make the overall macroeconomic policy credible. 
Section 2 defines the measure of credibility. Section 3 reports the empirical results 
for two recent reforms adopted in Brazil, the Cruzado and Collor plans. Section 4 
summarizes the main findings. 
1. MONETARY POLICY, FISCAL POLICY, AND CREDIBILITY 
Following Baxter (1985) we consider that the credibility of a monetary reform 
depends not only upon the monetary policy itself but lies in the interaction between 
the monetary and fiscal authorities established by the government's budget 
constraint.7 In order to reduce the inflationary pressures associated with the 
monetization of fiscal deficits, interest-bearing government debt is issued. Any 
further reduction in monetization, and simultaneous solvency, can only be 
guaranteed by an appropriate stream of budget surpluses. If no such fiscal correction 
is adopted, the solvency condition can only be met by issuing additional base 
money. Rational agents then extract from the implausibility of a future reversal in 
fiscal policy signals of an eventual inflationary financing.8 
More precisely, once monetary and fiscal authorities are considered separately there 
is the possibility that the two play a "game of chicken" over economic policy. 
Suppose the central bank promises to follow a tight monetary policy while the 
fiscal authority establishes taxes and expenditures that imply a stream of large 
future deficits. If both stick to their policies, the result is an overall macroeconomic 
program that is not credible because it is infeasible. The conflict is eventually solved 
when one of the two parties gives in. If the fiscal authority is stronger, the arithmetic 
of the government constraint makes the monetization of the deficit inevitable.9 It 
is via these channels that fiscal policy influences the credibility of monetary reform. 
Given these coordination problems the private sector speculates over who will 
impose discipline, and when the game between the policymakers will be solved. 
7 In fact this section closely follows BAXTER (1985). The only difference is that we also establish 
the feasibility conditions when a flexible exchange rate regime is chosen. 
8 A formalized discussion of the coordination problems faced by the monetary and fiscal authorities 
is given in SARGENT & WALLACE (1981) and SARGENT (1993). For a game-theoretic 
approach see MASCIANDARO & TABELLIN1 (1988). 
9 Of course, the monetary authority can also stick to its promise in which case the fiscal authority 
plays the role of the "chicken", and brings the budget into balance. This other possibility will be 
discussed later on. 
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We assume linear government policy rules. The constraints on the monetary 
authority depend on the exchange regime chosen. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime the rule for monetary policy is given by: 
DCt={\+l)+£t)DCt_x (1) 
where DCt is the level of domestic credit, 6 is the domestic credit growth rate, 
and £ is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero and variance Or. 
If the exchange rate is fixed the money supply is determined by demand factors, 
and any excess demand or supply will lead to a stock adjustment through 
accumulation or decumulation of reserves. So, if domestic credit grows faster than 
inflation, the excess supply of money will be lost through the balance of payments 
and eventually a shortage of reserves will lead to a collapse of the fixed regime. As 
purchasing power parity must hold in the long run, implying an equality between 
the domestic inflation rate, TT, and the foreign rate, TT , a fixed rate regime requires 
that the monetary authority choose 0 <K . This condition guarantees a 
sufficiently low growth of the domestic credit so that there are no reserve outflows 
to make the fixed exchange rate unsustainable. 
On the other hand, if the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate, it adjusts so that 
the balance of payments is always in equilibrium, and no movements in reserves 
are observed. In this case, the change in domestic credit is the change in the money 
supply, and thus in the rate of inflation. The rule for monetary policy is therefore 
given by: 
MBt={\ + e+£t)MBtA (T) 
where MBt is the stock of base or high powered money at time t, and 6 is the 
monetary base growth rate, and £ is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero and 
variance . In this case, a restrictive monetary policy implies 6<0 in every 
period. Some could argue that the condition 0 < 0 is too restrictive and suggest 
that, given that purchasing power parity holds in the long run, a less restrictive 
* 
but still credible monetary policy would be given by 6 < K + Ax, where Ax is 
the percentage rate of change of the exchange rate in the long run. The problem is 
that in a floating exchange rate regime the exchange rate adjusts instantaneously. 
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Then if the domestic inflation rate exceeds the foreign inflation rate, the domestic 
currency will depreciate at the rate of inflation differential in order to prevent the 
country's goods from becoming overpriced in world markets. The only way left to 
guarantee the public's faith in the central bank announcements is to make the bank 
announce a permanent control over money growth since this is the only variable it 
sets exogenously. 
The rule for the government deficit is given by 
Dt = (Xq + + ut (2) 
where Dt is the real value of the government deficit at time t net of interest 
payments, ^ is the real value of government debt at time t-1, and ut is an i.i.d. 
error term with mean zero and variance . 
The government's budget constraint is represented by 
D, = 5, - (1 + R)Bt_x + {DC, - DC,_X) I p, (3), under a fixed rate regime, and 
D, = B, -{\ + R)Bt_x + {MB, - MB,_X) / p, (3'), under a floating rate regime 
where R is the real rate of interest and p, is the price level in period t. 
Combining (2) and (3), and (2) and (3') we obtain the following two first-order 
difference equations in real debt, one for each type of exchange rate regime; 
B,=a„ + 5®,., - (DC, - DC,,,) / p, + u, (4) 
B, = «„ + - (MB, - MB,,,)/ p, + (4) 
where 7 = 1 + /? + cq • 
Substituting equation (1) in (4), and (T) in (4') we get: 
B,=a0+ yB,_x 
e (i + eT'fDcA 
—- + v, (5) 
\ + n\\ + n) \ P0 ) 
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e 
B, = «» + 
l + TT 
1+0 ^ 
V l + TT 
MB, 
Po 
+ 1- (5') 
y 
where Vl is an error term involving ut and ^, and is an error term 
involving ut and £t,£t_l,...,£]. 
1. Stability conditions for (5) and (5') imply that y<l, and 6< n ■ The condition 
y < \ implies that (Xx < —R, indicating that the government must promote some 
reduction of the principal of its debt. 
Based on this, a monetary policy reform can be considered credible if it satisfies 
two feasibility conditions for each type of exchange rate regime. For a fixed rate 
regime these conditions are : 
(i) 6 <K ,which guarantees a sufficiently low domestic credit growth rate, 
such that there is no continued reserve losses, and the inflation rate is reduced 
(ii) 7 < 1, and 0 < 0, that ensure that the path for real government debt is 
non-explosive. 
For a floating rate regime the conditions are: 
(i) 6<0, which ensures that the long-run inflation rate can be reduced 
(ii) 7 < 1, and 6< 71, that again impose limits on the government debt. 
2. MEASURING THE CREDIBILITY OF A MONETARY REFORM 
Let us assume that government policies take the form of a linear multiple 
regression model: 
y = XP+e 
where y is the policy's variable, X is a \xK vector of state variables, is a Kx\ 
vector of regression coefficients, and e is an independently and identically normally 
distributed error term with mean zero and variance (J2. 
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When the government announces a reform, private agents have some prior beliefs 
about the future value of More precisely, we assume they have a prior with 
inequality restrictions for given by g(j8,0") = (J over the feasible parameter 
region, and 0 outside this region.10 As time passes, information contained in 
the realizations of the policy variables is incorporated into the private sector's 
forecast of the future path of policy. 
Credibility is defined as the posterior probability assigned by the agents to the 
event that the government is really following the announced policy. If the 
government is really committed to its promises, so that the current course of 
economic policy is consistent with the program originally announced, the 
probability that the constraints implied by the announced measures are true is 
high and remains so as new information on the policy variables is obtained. 
When a prior with inequality restrictions is employed, Bayes' rules leads to a 
posterior density function for /3 which is a truncated multivariate t distribution.11 
Version 7 of SHAZAM includes sampling from a multivariate t distribution, and 
the associated computations for Monte Carlo Integration. This makes it possible 
to straightforwardly obtain estimates of posterior means and standard deviations, 
and, of particular interest here, posterior probability estimates for any specified 
region of the parameter space.12 
3. CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY REFORMS IN BRAZIL : CRUZADO 
PLAN, MARCH 1986 TO MA Y1987, AND COLLOR PLAN, 
MARCH 1990 TO JANUARY 1991 
The Brazilian economy's record after the mid-1980s shows that all attempts to 
end inflation were abandoned shortly after they were announced. The Bresser Plan 
lasted only six months, from July to December 1987, while the Cruzado, Summer 
10 BAXTER (1985) assumes a natural conjugate prior for (3. It is given by a multivariate normal 
distribution, conditional on O", and its specification requires values for a prior mean vector and 
a prior covariance matrix. Given the difficulty involved in specifying a complete prior covariance 
matrix, we prefer to adopt a prior with inequality restrictions. 
11 A good introduction to Bayesian analysis with inequality restrictions is given by JUDGE et alii 
(1988) and GRIFFITHS (1988). Indispensable, however, is GEWEKE (1986). 
12 Suppose Pr(0 < /? < 1) • This probability is given by the area under the posterior function g (/3l y). 
What Monte Carlo numerical integration does is to artificially draw a random sample from the 
density g{p\y). The proportion of these observations which lie between 0 and 1 is an estimate 
of Pr(0 < /3< 1). The degree of accuracy of the estimate depends on the choice of the size of the 
artificial sample. 
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and Collor plans lasted around twelve months. In addition to the short duration, 
two other points call attention. First, once an adjustment program failed it was 
immediately followed by another one, generating a sequence of stabilization 
attempts. Second, it seems that with each new attempt the government tried to 
pursue more drastic measures in an effort to convince the public of its commitment. 
After all, only a government determined to stop inflation would be willing to 
accept the consequent recession. 
All these facts "per se" can be considered an indication of the Brazilian economic 
authorities' lack of credibility or incapacity for commitment. However, if it is 
certain that at the final period of each of the stabilization plans the credibility was 
low, it is not known for sure that that had been the case from the announcement 
date. Moreover, the behavior of credibility may have shown a completely different 
pattern during the different programs. 
The discussion of credibility of disinflationary policies is important given the now 
general acceptance that the greater the belief in the government's commitment to 
the measures announced the lower the costs of reducing inflation. Also, it is 
accepted that credibility brings with it the added bonus of reducing inflation itself 
since the actual inflationary process depends on expectations about the future 
behavior of prices. What seems more appealing, however, is that once a credibility 
problem is identified, as well as its source, potential solutions can be presented to 
guarantee precommitment. 
Credibility, as defined in the previous section, will be calculated here for the Cruzado 
and Collor plans. This choice is supported by the fact that only these two programs 
could be characterized, at least at the time of their announcements, as an abrupt 
change in the government strategy for formulating economic policy. 
Based on the idea that the Brazilian inflation had as its main source an inertial 
component, the Cruzado Plan ingredients were formed primarily by the remotion 
of indexation, a general freeze of prices, including the exchange rate, and the 
adoption of a new currency. With respect to fiscal policy, the government believed 
that the measures adopted at the end of 1985 were sufficient to reduce the 
inflationary pressures derived from deficit financing. Neither were any targets 
established for the monetary policy.13 At least during the first months, the monetary 
policy would be used to accommodate the increase in the demand for money 
resulting from a decrease in the inflationary expectations. 
13 Although there was no announcement that a tight monetary policy would be followed, as 
observed before, the decision to fix the exchange rate constrains the choice of monetary policy. 
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The Collor Plan, on the other hand, made indisposable 80% of the money stock 
(M4=Ml+all other financial assets) which corresponded roughly to 30% of the 
GDP. The other 20% were converted into the new currency, and could be freely 
used.14 The purpose was to reduce the money stock in order to gain control over 
its flow, the money supply. On the fiscal side, an adjustment was announced of 
around 10% of the GDP that would be more than sufficient to balance the public 
accounts, thus avoiding the future use of debt or money financing. Especially 
emphasized as a means to achieve the proposed goal were the implementation of 
an administrative reform and the privatization of some public enterprises. And 
lastly, a floating exchange rate regime was adopted. 
It was previously argued that a feasible reform should satisfy two conditions for 
each exchange rate regime. The two conditions, in the case of a fixed or flexible 
rate regime, are independent in the sense that the choice of 0 does not constrain 
the choice of /. Given a choice of the domestic credit or monetary base growth, 
the government is free to choose the deficit path it likes. 
Although there is not necessarily any covariance between the rules for fiscal and 
monetary policy, it may exist when actual data is considered. Therefore, seemingly 
unrelated regression estimates were obtained to test for such covariance. 
For the Cruzado Plan (characterized by a fixed rate regime) 0 is estimated using 
equation (1), and / is obtained by equation (4), both reproduced below ; 
For the Collor Plan (characterized by a flexible rate regime), the parameters for 
the monetary and fiscal policies were estimated using equations (T) and (4') 
respectively. Both equations are also reproduced below: 
14 The resources blocked were subject to monetary correction of 6% per year, and would be made 
available again in twelve months. 
DCt =(l + 0+e, )DCt_[ (1) 
(4) 
MB, =(} +6+ £t (I') 
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(41) 
P, 
In fact, since the coefficient of 
{DC, - DCt_x) 
must be 1, the 
Pt Pt 
following regression can be run: 
B, — B, + yB,^ + u, (6) 
"i-   
where B, = B, 
(DC,-DC,_,) 
under a fixed rate regime, and 
P, 
=B | {MB, 
P. 
under a flexible rate regime 
The value of the Breusch-Pagan LM test for diagonal variance-covariance matrix 
for the Cruzado Plan equals 1.7845 while for the Collor Plan it is 1.1634, with 
one degree of freedom. Since both statistics are lower than the critical value of 
3.841 it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of covariance between the economic rules. 
Since monetary and fiscal policies can be considered independent events, the joint 
probability that both conditions are satisfied, that is, the credibility of the overall 
economic reform is given by pr{6 < K*)pr{Y <\), and pr{6<0)pr{'Y <\) 
respectively. 
The results for feasibility of the monetary and fiscal policies, as well as for the 
credibility of the overall macroeconomic programs, are presented below. 
Computation was made for 200,000 replications, including 100,000 antithetic 
ones.15 It is important to observe that as agents' prior beliefs about the parameters 
of the government rules are diffused, expectations can be rapidly affected by close 
adherence to the announced program. If the government returns to its initial plan, 
even after departing from it, the posterior means converge rapidly to the announced 
value. This explains in part some abrupt changes in expectations. 
15 The antithetic replication simply changes the sign of the vector of random numbers, and according 
to GEWEKE (1986), improves convergence substantially 
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For the Cruzado Plan, as is shown in Figure 1, the probability that the first 
condition for a feasible monetary reform is satisfied reaches 73% by July.16 After 
that good start credibility declines almost monotonically. In October, when the 
value of exports falls from US$2.1 billion to US$1.3 billion, credibility is less than 
30%. The parallel market premium reached 100% in October and November due 
to the increasing speculation of an eventual maxidevaluation of the currency. In 
fact, in October the government promoted a small devaluation (1.8%), revealing 
its incapacity to sustain a fixed exchange rate. In November the credibility of 
monetary policy is smaller than 10%, and remains quite low until the official end 
of the reform period. 
FIGURE 1 - CRUZADO: PROBABILITY OF FEASIBLE MONETARY POLICY 
0,8 t 
0,6 
0,5
 ~ \ 
0,4 \ / 
03
 " \ / 
0,2 ^  / 
0 ^^^ 1 1 1 1 ^^ 1 1 
Jul/86 Ago/86 Set/86 Out/86 Nov/86 Dez/86 Jan/87 Fev/87 Mar/87 Abr/87 Mai/87 
The probability that fiscal policy was "feasible" falls over the course of the reform 
(Figure 2) until November. Despite this fact, the probability that y < 1 is higher 
than 50% is observed in almost all the periods, except October and November. 
FIGURE 2 CRUZADO: PROBABILITY OF FEASIBLE FISCAL POLICY 
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16 Our estimations start when n = 5, even for the fiscal policy rule that includes a constant. 
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The credibility of the reform was defined as the probability that feasibility 
conditions for the monetary and fiscal policies are satisfied. The credibility of the 
Cruzado Plan is shown in Figure 3. In the fifth month after the announcement 
date it is as high as 55%, falling systematically after that. Although information 
for the months that immediately followed the announcement is not available, the 
results obtained here can account also for the pattern suggested by survey evidence 
(NOVAES, 1990) and Agenor and Taylor (1992). Just four or five months after 
the plan was adopted, the initial gain in credibility was continuously lost. This 
happened despite the adoption of an external commitment. In fact, as observed by 
Cukierman, Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) the announcement of a fixed exchange 
rate represented a very weak commitment. "Policymakers did not tie their hands in 
any way, and it was clear from the outset that their main objective was to halt an 
inflationary acceleration rather than to bring about permanent price stability." {p. 16)17 
FIGURE 3 - CRUZADO: PROBABILITY OF CREDIBLE REFORM 
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The credibility of monetary policy during the Collor Plan remains below 50% 
over the whole reform period (Figure 4). The probability of a feasible monetary 
policy is 36% in the fifth month after the announcement date, and decreases almost 
montonically after that, reaching only 6% in December 1990, one month before 
the reform is abandoned. 
17 Among the stabilization policies evaluated by these authors the Cruzado Plan appears as the one 
with the weakest commitment. The degrees of commitment to the stabilization program in 
Israel and in Argentina (Austral Plan) were stronger because the fixed exchange rate was supported 
by a promise of no monetization of the budget deficit. The programs adopted in Europe in the 
1920s and the 1991 Convertibility Plan in Argentina represented an even a stronger commitment 
given that the fixed exchange rate was supported by a legal obligation to back the issuance of 
money with foreign assets. 
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FIGURE 4- COLLOR: PROBABILITY OF FEASIBLE MONETARY POLICY 
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The results obtained for the probability of a feasible fiscal policy are much better 
(Figure 5). It starts quite high (84%), and its lowest value is as high as 60% 
observed in November. 
FIGURE 5 - COLLOR: PROBABILITY OF FEASIBLE FISCAL POLICY 
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Finally, the credibility of the overall stabilization plan is quite low as can be seen in 
Figure 6. In July it reaches only 30%, and after that falls almost continually. 
FIGURE 6 - COLLOR: PROBABILITY OF CREDIBLE REFORM 
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When comparing the Cruzado and Collor Plans two common features call 
immediate attention. First, both plans presented a low credibility of monetary 
policy. Although the Cruzado Plan had a much better start, the fact is that in 
general credibility is almost always below 50%. Second, credibility of fiscal policy 
is surprisingly high during both stabilization programs. 
As observed in section 1, the sustainability condition of fiscal policy is derived 
from the government's budget constraint. One explanation for the high credibility 
of fiscal policy could then be that the government follows a debt-financing regime 
in which the deficits are temporary, and are expected to be followed by offsetting 
prospective surpluses (Ricardian regime). However, if this is the case, the path of 
base money should be unaffected by the deficits, and so the credibility of monetary 
policy should also be high. As this is not the case, this kind of regime seems an 
inadequate description of the Brazilian's government recent behavior. 
Another explanation is that the government is following a regime similar to the 
one described by Sargent and Wallace (1981), and Sargent (1993). The government 
is running such a persistent stream of large deficits that increases in the monetary 
base have to be used to finance the budget. The "Inflation tax", as an additional 
source of revenue, then guarantees that the budget is balanced, assuring the 
credibility of fiscal policy. On the other hand, as the agents are aware of the debt- 
financing regime followed, they know that any announcement of a more 
conservative monetary policy cannot be trusted. 
This argument is valid only in the case of "fiscal dominance", that is, when fiscal 
policy is given exogenously, independent of monetary policy. Formal evidence that 
this is the regime followed by the Brazilian government can be found in Pastore 
(1995) and Rocha (1995). Some informal evidence, as observed by Masciandaro 
and Tabellini (1988), comes from the fact that the "degree of fiscal dominance" 
can be interpreted as a measure of central bank independence from the fiscal 
authority. Three measures of central bank independence obtained from Cukierman, 
Webb, and Neyapti (1992) give some idea of the high subordination of the Brazilian 
central bank to the needs of the government.18 Although these indices represent 
18 The first measure is a legal measure of independence, and is based on the written information 
expressed in the charters of the central banks of the different countries. In a range from zero 
(minimum independence) to one (maximum independence) the Brazilian index is 0.21 during 
the eighties. This corresponds to the 62nd place from the top when the whole sample of 72 
countries is considered, and the 44th place when considering only the 51 developing countries. 
As the practical application of the law can be more important than what the law itself establishes, 
especially with respect to developing countries, the actual frequency of turnover of central bank 
officers is used as another measure. It corresponds to the average number of central bank officer's 
changes per annum in a country/subperiod, and is based on the presumption that, at least above 
some threshold, a larger turnover of central bank officers indicate a lower level of autonomy. For 
1950-89 Brazil presented the second highest average turnover rate among all the countries in 
the sample. Brazil's index is 0.68 (an average turnover of about 18 months), a little bit better 
than the 0.93 value (an average turnover of about 13 months) achieved by the Argentine central 
bank. Finally, when the legal independence and turnover indices arc combined to form an overall 
measure of central bank independence the Brazilian central bank is again classified near the 
bottom. It only has a better index than those presented by Argentina and Chile. 
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quite indirect evidence, especially if the great subjectivity involved in their 
construction is taken into account, they give additional support to the hypothesis 
that the recent debt-financing regime followed implies an exogenous fiscal policy. 
We have, therefore, that both the Cruzado and Collor Plans encourage a policy for 
the monetary authority that would be appropriate for a Ricardian regime but 
advocating plans for taxes and expenditures that could be feasible only under a 
fiscal dominance regime. Such monetary and fiscal policies are, however, 
incompatible. It is not feasible to carry out both at the same time, and this explains 
the overall low credibility, and ultimate failure, of these two economic reforms.19 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The credibility of monetary reform was considered to depend on both monetary 
and fiscal policies. If the private sector believes that the real value of government 
debt is following an explosive path, they will assign a high probability to the event 
that the monetary reform will be abandoned. This results from the fact that a fiscal 
deficit, in the long run, is incompatible with low monetary expansion. 
The results obtained for the Brazilian Cruzado and Collor plans are quite 
interesting. The credibility of fiscal policy is high even though no fiscal correction 
was implemented, indicating that seigniorage is responsible for the non-explosive 
path of the government debt. This, on the other hand, explains the low credibility 
of monetary policy. Therefore, there is an indication of a monetary regime of fiscal 
dominance. In this case, encouragement of a more restrictive monetary policy is 
simply incompatible with tax and expenditure plans that imply large deficits. The 
overall credibility is low because such monetary and fiscal policies are incompatible. 
The major opportunities for further research seem to be empirical. The technical 
and conceptual problems are considerable, particularly when the adopted programs 
are of short duration as in the Brazilian case. Some suggestions are: 
1) Measure credibility continuously over time, that is, also in periods where 
there is no strong change in policy. 
2) Generically speaking, credibility is the private sector's degree of belief in the 
consistency between the current economic policy and the program originally 
announced by policymakers. It is related, therefore, to the of the economic 
authorities' capacity for commitment. When calculating credibility, one is 
concerned about how serious the problem of noncommitment is as perceived 
by the agents. So, it would be interesting to distinguish empirically between 
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periods in which policy precommitment was effective and those in which it 
was not. Once this is done, the next step would be to measure how important 
the lack of credibility was. 
3) Test the time inconsistency hypothesis that is considered to be the heart of 
the recent credibility literature. 
4) Verify how important credibility is for practical policymaking. 
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